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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that belief in free will helps to inhibit anti-social impulses. As a 
result, belief in free will enables the creation of and participation in society. Consistently, we 
propose that belief in free will is associated with a sense of belongingness. As previous 
research indicates that belongingness is a source of meaning in life, we predicted that belief 
in free will in turn facilitates increased meaningfulness via feelings of belongingness. To test 
this hypothesis, we conducted two preliminary, small-scale studies and a large-scale study 
using individual difference data. As expected, in Study 1, the positive association between 
free will beliefs and meaningfulness was mediated by feelings of belongingness. In Study 2, 
this effect emerged using alternative measures of free will belief and belongingness, adding 
to the findings’ reliability and validity. In Study 3, these effects were again replicated with a 
large sample of participants using separate and composite measures of free will belief and 
belongingness. Finally, we conducted multiple group comparisons and meta-analyses. These 
confirmed that the proposed correlations and indirect effects were significant and consistent 
across studies. Our findings provide important understandings of the functions and 
consequences of free will beliefs. 
Keywords: free will, belongingness, meaning, self-regulation, existential psychology 
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Free, Connected, and Meaningful: Free Will Beliefs Promote Meaningfulness Through 
Belongingness 
 Belief in free will has been conceptualized as thinking that people and the self are free 
from internal (e.g., genes, personality) or external (e.g., fate) constraints, capable of 
controlling and being responsible for their actions, and directing their actions to achieve 
desired goals involving high levels of conscious thought and deliberation (Monroe & Malle, 
2010; Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011). Belief in free will is embedded in cultures 
worldwide (Sarkissian et al., 2010), which explains why many people may adopt such beliefs 
(Baumeister & Brewer, 2012; Paulhus & Carey, 2011). These beliefs originate from the 
perceived match between one’s conscious thoughts and observed actions (Wegner, 2003; 
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) and are based on the premise that different behavioral choices 
exist (Monroe & Malle, 2010): one is also capable of doing otherwise (Berger & Ramon, 
2013; Bertelsen, 2011; Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong, 2014). Thus, the experience of free 
will is based on the understanding that one’s thoughts are responsible for implementing and 
controlling one’s actions (Wegner, 2005). Subsequently, people believe that they have the 
power to control their own behavior and that they are ultimately responsible for it (Feldman 
et al., 2014).  
Philosophers and psychologists suggested that whether free will actually exists or not, 
life could appear meaningless without believing in it (e.g., Flanagan, 1996). This is an 
important point because people have existential needs to experience meaning in life (e.g., 
Greenberg, Koole, & Pyszczynski, 2004). Personal choice over one’s outcomes provided by 
free will beliefs makes events and experiences seem more meaningful because the action 
chosen was selected from several possibilities (Seto, Hicks, Davis, & Smallman, 2014). If 
people believed that their choices were deterministically governed, whatever they said or did 
would be construed as the only choice they had and would diminish the appeal of their 
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actions and ultimately the significance of their existence (Bergner & Ramon, 2013). In a 
similar context, several researchers argue that belief in free will subsumes choice and control 
(Baumeister, Crescioni, & Alquist, 2011; Feldman et al., 2014; Stillman et al., 2011). A sense 
of control is an important basis of meaning because it promotes other fundamental meaning 
sources such as self-esteem and certainty (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Shariff, Schooler, & 
Vohs, 2008). Indeed, Crescioni, Baumeister, Ent, Ainsworth, and Lambert (2016) recently 
found that belief in free will led participants to set more meaningful, future goals. Thus, 
strong belief in free will likely promotes meaningfulness (Crescioni et al., 2016; Seto et al., 
2014).  
Many existential needs are also met in human relationships, including the need for 
meaning (Baumeister, 2005; Stillman et al., 2009). Of note, belongingness is a key source of 
meaningfulness (Heine et al., 2006; Williams, 2002). Belongingness promotes 
meaningfulness through several mechanisms, including social identity, inclusion, successful 
pursuit of valued goals (being a helpful individual, feeling appreciated and validated by 
others; Heine et al., 2006; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2013; Williams, 2002), as well as 
gaining access to resources and control over one’s environment (Stillman, Lambert, Fincham, 
& Baumeister, 2011). Several meaning threats (e.g., mortality salience, loneliness) promote 
strivings for belongingness to re-affirm meaningfulness (e.g., Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Simon, 1996; Stillman et al., 2009). In a similar vein, being denied feelings of 
belongingness reduces the perceived meaningfulness of life (e.g., Zadro, Williams, & 
Richardson, 2004). Indeed, a lack of belongingness, for example represented by ostracism 
(Williams, 2002), social exclusion (Stillman et al., 2009), or loneliness (Zhou, Sedikides, 
Wildschut, & Gao, 2008) causally reduces perceived meaning. Furthermore, exclusion 
impairs self-regulation. Accordingly, some researchers suggested that belongingness may be 
a fundamental reason to self-control (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005; 
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Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2002). In sum, 
people have pronounced belongingness needs that serve a variety of important functions, 
including providing people with a sense of meaning. 
1.1 An Adaptive Function of Belief in Free Will: Belongingness 
 Regarding our discussion on belongingness, various scholars point out that belief in 
free will also has important societal implications (Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman, & Vohs, 
2008; Vohs & Baumeister, 2010). These scholars argue that belief in free will impacts on 
basic conscious and unconscious processes related to self-control (e.g., intentional binding, 
intentional inhibition, voluntary motor preparation) and perceptions of self-control (Aarts & 
Van den Bos, 2011; Lynn, Muhle-Karbe, Aarts, & Brass, 2014; Rigoni, Kühn, Gaudino , 
Sartori, & Brass, 2012). As such, belief in free will encourages thoughtful reflection and 
willingness to exert effort to overcome automatic, anti-social impulses (e.g., Baumeister, 
Crescioni, & Alquist, 2011; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010a), resulting in socially desirable 
and harmonious actions (Baumeister, 2008a).  
For example, Stillman, Baumeister, et al. (2011) found that actions perceived to be 
free are seen as essential in achieving moral behavior. Indeed, several researchers reported an 
association between free will beliefs and moral responsibility (e.g., Clark et al., 2014; 
Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005; Shariff et al., 2014): Bergner and Ramon 
(2013) reported that belief in free will correlated positively with endorsing morality as an 
important dimension of life and with maintaining higher personal moral standards. 
MacKenzie, Vohs, and Baumeister (2014) also found that free will belief predicted gratitude 
that is in turn linked to pro-social behavior and enhancing close relationships. Collectively, 
these behaviors are enacted, at least in some circumstances, to gain acceptance, facilitating 
social bonds (e.g., Gordon, Impett, Kogan, Oveis, & Keltner, 2012), and serving the need to 
FREE, CONNECTED, AND MEANINGFUL                                                                        6 
 
belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Thus, we argue that free will beliefs are associated with 
feelings of belongingness. 
 Consistently, researchers suggested that belief in free will is a functional cultural 
belief (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Bertelsen, 2011) that contributed to the cultural evolution 
of humans (Baumeister et al., 2008). To comprehend its link to feelings of belongingness, one 
must understand that belongingness is a core human need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) 
because it provides many benefits (e.g., increased food supply, environmental protection; 
Baumeister, 2005). Therefore, humans regulate their behavior in order to facilitate 
belongingness (Baumeister, 2008a; Baumeister et al., 2005; Baumeister et al., 2011). That is, 
individual differences that motivate people to gain acceptance and avoid rejection are 
essential for survival (Malone, Pillow, & Osman, 2012). Hence, Baumeister (2005) argues 
that basic psychological beliefs and mechanisms provided a basis for initiating and later 
evolved to maintain bonds with one’s social group.   
In this regard, many researchers argue that belief in free will developed sequentially 
in human psychology (Baumeister, 2005, 2008b; see also Baumeister et al., 2011). Initiative, 
facilitated by a basic form of free will belief, is believed to have developed before humanity 
became a mainly social species to enable animals to navigate the physical environment to 
satisfy their motivations (e.g., finding food). Becoming more social during evolution gave 
humanity and its ancestors an evolutionary advantage (Barchas, 1986; Baumeister, 2005, 
2008a, 2008b). As evolution tends to build on the past and modifies existing systems 
(Allman, 1999), belief in free will and its related psychological capacities (e.g., initiative) 
likely emerged first to improve survival and reproduction and later adaptations built on that 
capacity and adapted it to new developments in the social environment (Baumeister et al., 
2011).  
FREE, CONNECTED, AND MEANINGFUL                                                                        7 
 
To be social, humanity must have had these basic free will beliefs and their related 
inner structures as a capacity for co-operating with others within the cultures of these groups 
(Baumeister, 2008b). In an evolutionary sense, free will beliefs would have been essential in 
a culture that involves rules and interdependent roles that require exercising self-control and 
restraining automatic, anti-social impulses (Baumeister, 2008a, 2008b; Baumeister et al., 
2008). Therefore, belief in free will may have developed further as an adaptation to meet the 
escalating demands of, opportunities intrinsic to, and facilitate a new form of human social 
living. These beliefs and related psychological capacities would have helped people to 
override their automatic selfish impulses that demanded greater mental energy and self-
regulatory resources (Baumeister et al., 2011; DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; 
DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). Again, this effortful form of self-regulation 
to restrain selfish impulses seems to be enacted for the purpose of belongingness (Baumeister 
et al., 2005; Twenge et al., 2001; Twenge et al., 2002). Indeed, empirical evidence shows that 
belief in free will causally effects pro-social behavior that benefits belongingness to groups 
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010b; Vohs & Schooler, 2008).  
Beyond these additional benefits however, being a part of a group helped to satisfy 
people’s fundamental need to belong. Belief in free will was functional for adherence to rules 
and norms, which were important to gain acceptance and approval into society (Baumeister et 
al., 2011). That is, belief in free will helped people to restrain their impulses so as to gain 
acceptance and approval from groups, which in turn promoted feelings of belongingness 
(e.g., Baumeister, 2008b).  
Again, one of the great benefits that feelings of belongingness offer is that they serve 
as a key source of perceived meaning in life (Heine et al., 2006; Stillman et al., 2009; 
Williams, 2002). Building on these findings, we argue that belief in free will also promotes a 
sense of belongingness by controlling non-social and selfish behaviors for acceptance to and 
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membership of social groups (Baumeister, 2005; Baumeister et al., 2011). Therefore, we 
argue that free will belief also indirectly enhances meaning in life through these feelings of 
belongingness. That is, meaning in life substantiates the relationship between free will beliefs 
and belongingness. 
1.2 Free Will Adds to Meaning in Life via Belongingness 
In sum, prior research suggests that belief in free will promotes behaviors associated 
with a sense of belongingness (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Baumeister et al., 2011), even 
though empirical tests of this proposed association seem to be lacking. Crucial for our 
hypothesis is previous research that established causal relationships between free will beliefs 
and behaviors related to belongingness (e.g., MacKenzie et al., 2014; Shariff et al., 2014; 
Stillman & Baumeister, 2010b) and between belongingness and presence of meaning in life 
(e.g., Stillman et al., 2009; Williams, 2002). Two independent, experimental lines of research 
thus demonstrated that belief in free will causes behaviors associated with increased 
belongingness and that belongingness causes increased perceived meaning in life. We 
integrated these notions into our proposed mediation model. Specifically, we hypothesized a 
relationship between belief in free will and a sense of belongingness that ultimately promotes 
meaningfulness. In other words, we predicted (1) a relationship between free will beliefs and 
perceived meaningfulness and (2) that this relationship would be mediated, at least in part, by 
feelings of belongingness. To our knowledge, previous research has not tested our proposed 
model. By testing these novel predictions, we aimed at integrating two research traditions—
one on free will and the other on perceived meaning in life—by demonstrating how the 
relationship between free will beliefs and belongingness are substantiated by meaningfulness. 
Indeed, our hypothesis expands on research by Crescioni et al. (2016) by noting another 
pathway between free will beliefs and meaningfulness via feelings of belongingness rather 
than by setting meaningful goals. We conducted three studies that focused on individual 
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differences. Studies 1 and 2 were preliminary tests of our hypothesis and Study 3 was a larger 
scale study. All studies included a measure of belief in free will, a measure of belongingness 
as a mediating variable, and a measure of perceived meaning in life. 
2. Study 1 
2.1 Method 
 2.1.1 Participants and design. Ninety participants were recruited in exchange for 
€0.24 (Mage = 28.38, SD = 8.81, age range = 18-63; 37 women, 53 men). There were 35 US 
Americans, 29 British, and 20 people with other nationalities. Seventy-two were Caucasian, 9 
had Asian ethnicity, 3 were Black, and the remaining 5 had other ethnicities. We recruited 
participants using the Prolific Academic website (www.prolificacademic.co.uk). This facility 
has been developed for web-based research by academic researchers in exchange for 
payment. 
 2.1.2 Pre-test. First, we conducted a pre-test to confirm a direct relationship between 
free will beliefs and meaningfulness. We recruited fifty participants via 
prolificacademic.co.uk (Mage = 28.92, SD = 10.30, age: 18-53; 26 men, 24 women). 
Participants completed Steger, Frazier, Oishi, and Kaler’s (2006) presence of meaning 
subscale (α = .91). We measured belief in free will with the personal free will subscale from 
the free will and determinism scale (α = .84; Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008). Our 
analysis showed a significant, positive correlation between belief in free will and presence of 
meaning in life, r(48) = .30, p = .04, consistent with our hypothesis and previous literature 
(Crescioni et al., 2016). Having established that belief in free will had a relationship with 
meaningfulness, we proceeded to test whether free will would predict meaningfulness 
through increased feelings of belongingness. 
 2.1.3 Materials and procedure. Participants gave their informed consent and 
provided demographic details. Next, they completed three scales randomized in order. Belief 
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in free will was measured with the free will subscale of the free will and determinism scale – 
plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011), consisting of seven items (e.g., “People have complete control 
over the decisions they make”; 1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree; M = 4.85, SD = 
1.01; α = 0.79). This scale was used in previous research on the effects of free will beliefs 
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). We assessed belongingness with the 
general belongingness scale (Malone et al., 2012). This 12-item scale has been extensively 
validated (e.g., “I feel connected with others”; M = 5.25, SD = 1.07; α = .92). We measured 
meaning in life with the validated presence of meaning in life scale, a subscale of the 
meaning in life questionnaire (Steger et al., 2006), consisting of five items (e.g., “I have a 
good sense of what makes my life meaningful”; 1 = absolutely untrue, 7 = absolutely true; M 
= 4.89, SD = 1.38; α = .91). Afterwards, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
All studies were approved by the institution’s Research Ethics Committee. In all 
studies, participants were told that their data would be treated confidentially and they had a 
right to withdraw at any time. 
 2.1.4 Data screening. The distribution of presence of meaning in life scores was 
significantly negatively skewed when investigated using the Shapiro-Wilks test, S-W = 0.95, 
df = 90, p = .002. This skew was counteracted by conducting inverse and logarithmic 
transformations on those scores, S-W = 0.98, df = 90, p = 0.09. All scores were standardized 
to prevent multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) and to maintain consistency between 
the three scales. 
2.2 Results and Discussion 
 2.2.1 Correlations. Free will beliefs correlated positively and significantly with 
presence of meaning in life, r(88) = .32, p < .005, and with belongingness, r(88) = .23, p = 
.03. Further, we found a significant, positive correlation between belongingness and 
meaningfulness, r(88)= .56, p < .001. According to guidelines developed by Cohen (1988), 
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the effect sizes of these correlations were medium, small, and large respectively. Collectively, 
these relationships were in accordance with our predictions.  
 2.2.2 Mediation analysis. To test our hypothesis that belief in free will fosters 
meaningfulness by imbuing life with a sense of belongingness, we conducted a mediation 
analysis using Hayes’ (2012, Model 4) PROCESS macro. Belief in free will was entered as 
the predictor variable in the model. Belongingness was entered as the mediating variable and 
presence of meaning as the outcome variable. The direct effect of free will on presence of 
meaning remained significant after including the proposed mediator, B = 0.20, SE= 0.09, p = 
.03. Importantly, and as predicted, there was a significant indirect effect of belief in free will 
on presence of meaning through belongingness, ab = 0.12, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.02, 0.22], 
estimated using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstraps (Hayes, 2013). Thus, feelings of 
belongingness mediated the relationship between belief in free will and presence of meaning 
(Figure 1).  
The data support our mediation model, formulated based on earlier experimental 
research (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Shariff et al., 2014; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010b), in 
which the association between belief in free will and meaningfulness was transmitted by a 
sense of belongingness. This finding is in accordance with our hypothesis and, to our 
knowledge, has not been demonstrated in previous research. In addition, we believe that 
Study 1 is the first instance in which belief in free will has been empirically linked to feelings 
of belongingness. We conducted a complementary study, with alternative measures, to test 
whether the same pattern would emerge with different operationalizations of the core 
concepts. 
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3. Study 2 
 In Study 2, we used alternative measures of free will beliefs and belongingness. 
Again, we predicted that belief in free will is positively associated with presence of meaning 
in life, mediated by feelings of belongingness. 
3.1 Method 
 3.1.1 Participants and design. Eighty-one participants were recruited (Mage = 28.63, 
SD = 9.84, age range = 18-56; 43 women, 38 men) from Prolific Academic in exchange for a 
€0.24 remuneration. Demographics were 43 British, 19 US Americans, and 14 other 
nationalities. Sixty-four were Caucasian, 7 were Asian, and the remainder consisted of 4 
other ethnicities. All participants reported acceptable English language ability. 
 3.1.2 Materials and procedure. First, participants gave informed consent and 
reported demographics. Three scales were then presented in random order. Belief in free will 
was assessed using the personal free will subscale of the free will and determinism scale 
(Rakos et al., 2008). This scale contains eight items (e.g., “I am in charge of the decisions I 
make,”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 5.57, SD = 0.81; α = .78). 
 To measure belongingness, we measured the reverse-scored UCLA loneliness scale 
(version 3; Russell, 1996). This scale consists of twenty items (e.g., “How often do you feel 
close to people?”; 1 = never, 4 = always, M = 4.31, SD = 0.43; α = .91). The scale has been 
recommended for studies that examine feelings of belongingness and identifies those who are 
not lonely (Cacioppo, Hawkley, & Bernsten, 2003). For example, reverse scoring items on 
the UCLA loneliness scale has been shown to endorse feelings of non-loneliness (Russell, 
Peplau, & Cutrona, 1980). Indeed, a confirmatory factor analysis showed that the scale 
measures a bipolar loneliness factor with lower scores indicating greater social engagement 
(Russell, 1996). Furthermore, prior research has also shown that low levels of loneliness are 
associated with fulfilled belongingness needs and satisfaction with personal relationships 
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(Mellor, Stokes, Firth, Hayashi, & Cummins, 2008). We included the presence of meaning 
subscale as in Study 1 (M = 4.92, SD = 1.17; α = .85; Steger et al., 2006). Afterwards, 
participants were thanked and debriefed. 
3.1.3 Data screening. The presence of meaning scores showed a significant negative 
skew, S-W = 0.97, df = 81, p = .04. We counteracted this skew by conducting  inverse and 
logarithmic transformations on scores for that construct, S-W = 0.98, df = 81, p = .27. Again, 
all scores were standardized to prevent multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) and to 
maintain consistency between the three scales. 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
 3.2.1 Correlations. As predicted, belief in free will correlated positively and 
significantly with presence of meaning in life, r(79) = .23, p = .04. There was a significant, 
positive correlation between belief in free will and the reverse-scored loneliness scale, r(79) = 
.27, p = .02. Similarly, presence of meaning correlated positively and significantly with the 
reverse-scored loneliness scale, r(79) = .46, p < .001. According to guidelines developed by 
Cohen (1988), the effect sizes of these correlations were small and medium respectively. 
Collectively, these relationships were in accordance with our predictions and Study 1’s 
findings. 
 3.2.2 Mediation analysis. The hypothesized mediation model was evaluated using 
Hayes’ (2012, Model 4) PROCESS macro. Belief in free will was entered as the predictor 
variable in the model, reverse loneliness was the mediator, and meaningfulness was the 
outcome variable (Figure 2). We found a significant indirect effect of belief in free will on 
meaningfulness through belongingness, ab = 0.11, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.03, 0.26], estimated 
using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstraps (Hayes, 2013). The direct effect became non-
significant after including the mediator, B = 0.12, SE = 0.10, p = .25.  
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The data support our theoretical model. Specifically, the results support our 
hypothesis that belief in free will predicts perceived meaningfulness, mediated by a sense of 
belongingness, using different measures of free will and belongingness than in Study 1. 
Again, to our knowledge, this relationship has not been identified in previous research. As a 
more robust test of our hypothesis, we aimed to replicate the indirect effects from the 
preliminary tests, Studies 1 and 2, in a substantially larger sample that amalgamated the free 
will belief and belongingness measures. 
4. Study 3 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants and design. Two hundred and sixty-eight participants were 
recruited via MTurk in exchange for €0.23 (Mage = 36.70, SD = 12.64, age range = 18-74; 144 
women, 122 men). Two hundred and thirty-four participants were US American and the 
remaining participants constituted 14 other nationalities. Two hundred and nineteen 
participants were Caucasian, 19 were Asian, 15 were Black, and the remaining participants 
had other ethnicities. All participants reported acceptable English. 
4.1.2 Materials and procedure. Participants gave their informed consent and 
reported demographics. Next, the five scales from the previous two studies were presented to 
participants in a random order. That is, participants completed two measures of belief in free 
will, one on presence of meaning, and two on perceived belongingness. Again, the belief in 
free will scales were the free will subscale of the free will and determinism scale – plus 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011), consisting of seven items (e.g., “People have complete free will”; 1 
= strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree; M = 5.34, SD = 1.09; α = 0.87) and the personal 
free will subscale of the free will and determinism scale (Rakos et al., 2008), consisting of 
eight items, (“I actively choose what to do from among the options I have.”; 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 5.54, SD = 0.90; α = 0.78). Meaningfulness was measured 
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using the five-item presence of meaning subscale from the meaning in life questionnaire (e.g., 
“My life has a clear sense of purpose.”; 1 = absolutely untrue, 7 = absolutely true; M = 4.93, 
SD = 1.56; α = 0.95; Steger et al., 2006). Belongingness was measured using the ‘general 
belongingness scale’ (Malone et al., 2012) consisting of twelve items (e.g., “I have a sense of 
belonging.”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 4.92, SD = 1.41; α = .96) and the 
reverse-scored UCLA loneliness scale (Russell, 1996), consisting of twenty items (e.g., “How 
often do you feel that you are “in tune” with the people around you?”; 1 = never, 4 = always; 
M = 2.75, SD = 0.62; α = .96). Afterwards, participants were debriefed, thanked, and 
rewarded.  
4.1.3 Data analysis. The free will (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) and the personal free will 
subscales (Rakos et al., 2008) were transformed using the logarithmic and square root 
formulas respectively to reduce the impact of outliers. In the mediation analyses reported 
below, all scores were standardized to prevent multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) 
and to maintain consistency between the scales. 
4.1.4 Composites analyses. First, we examined the relationships between our two 
belief in free will scales and two belongingness scales. As expected, the free will subscale 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011) correlated positively and significantly with the personal free will 
scale (Rakos et al., 2008), r(265) = .52, p < .001. Furthermore, when the two free will belief 
scales were amalgamated, the composite had acceptable reliability (α = .88; M = 5.45, SD = 
0.88).  
Similarly, we examined the relationships between the two belongingness scales. As 
expected, the general belongingness scale (Malone et al., 2012) correlated positively and 
significantly with the reverse-scored UCLA scale (Russell, 1996), r(265) = .91, p < .001. In 
addition, when the two belongingness scales were amalgamated, the composite had 
acceptable reliability (α = .98; M = 4.65, SD = 1.28).  
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These findings suggested that the two sets of scales were appropriate for creating 
composite measures of free will beliefs and belongingness. In further analyses, scores on the 
reverse-scored UCLA loneliness scale (Russell, 1996) were transformed from those on a four 
point scale to that of a seven point scale to maintain consistency between the belongingness 
scales. To further justify that these sets of scales should be amalgamated, we conducted two 
exploratory factor analyses. 
4.1.5 Factor analyses. First, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the 15 
belief in free will items. We used the principal axis factoring method for factor extraction 
with a direct oblimin rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was 
.91, above the recommended minimum value of .6. In addition, Bartlett’s test of Sphericity 
was significant, χ2 (105) = 2386.114, p < .001, indicating suitability of our data for factor 
analysis. A subsequent analysis resulted in a one-factor solution accounting for 47.51% of the 
variance. Factor 1 had an eigenvalue of 7.13 and standardized coefficients ranged from .52 to 
.81. Based on the factor loadings and internal reliability, we created a composite variable of 
belief in free will by amalgamating the two free will scales.  
Similarly, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the 32 items from the two 
belongingness scales. Again, we used the principal axis factoring method for factor extraction 
with a direct oblimin rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was 
.97, above the recommended minimum value of .6. In addition, Bartlett’s test of Sphericity 
was significant, χ2 (496) = 7710.052, p < .001, indicating suitability of our data for factor 
analysis. A subsequent analysis using a one-factor solution accounted for 59% of the 
variance. This factor had an eigenvalue of 18.88 and standardized coefficients ranged from 
.49 to .86. Again, based on the factor loadings and internal reliability, we created a composite 
variable of belongingness by amalgamating the two belongingness scales.   
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4.2 Results and Discussion 
4.2.1 Correlations. As predicted, the belief in free will composite correlated 
positively and significantly with presence of meaning in life, r(265) = .49, p < .001. In 
addition, the free will belief composite correlated positively and significantly with the 
belongingness composite, r(265) = .45, p < .001. Presence of meaning also correlated 
positively and significantly with the belongingness composite, r(265) = .65, p < .001. The 
effect sizes of these correlations were medium (approaching large) and large, respectively 
(Cohen, 1988). Collectively, these relationships were in accordance with our hypothesis.  
4.2.2 Mediation analysis. We tested our proposed indirect effect using Hayes’ (2012, 
Model 4) PROCESS macro. The belief in free will composite was entered as the predictor 
variable in the model, the belongingness composite was entered as the mediator, and 
meaningfulness was entered as the outcome variable. As expected, there was a significant 
indirect effect of belief in free will on meaningfulness through feelings of belongingness, ab 
= 0.24, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.17, 0.33], estimated using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstraps 
(Hayes, 2013) (Figure 3). The direct effect remained significant, B = 0.25, SE = 0.05, p < 
.001. Thus, we replicated our proposed mediation model in a large-scale study: belief in free 
will promoted meaningfulness through feelings of belongingness.  
 4.2.3 Replication: Study 1. Additionally, we investigated whether the indirect effect 
from Study 1 would replicate with only the specific measures of that prior study. As expected 
and replicating Study 1, belief in free will (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) correlated positively and 
significantly with presence of meaningfulness, r(265) = .46, p < .001. Belief in free will also 
correlated positively and significantly with belongingness (Malone et al., 2012), r(265) = .43, 
p < .001. Finally, belongingness correlated positively and significantly with meaningfulness, 
r(265) = .63, p < .001. The effect sizes of these correlations were medium and large 
respectively (Cohen, 1988).  
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To test our proposed indirect effect, we used Hayes’s (2012, Model 4) PROCESS 
macro. Again, belief in free will scores were entered as the predictor variable, belongingness 
was entered as the mediator, and meaningfulness was entered as the outcome variable (all 
standardized). As expected, there was a significant indirect effect of free will beliefs on 
meaningfulness through feelings of belongingness, ab = 0.23, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.15, 0.32], 
estimated using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstraps (Hayes, 2013) (Figure 4). The direct effect 
remained significant, B = 0.24, SE = 0.05, p < .001. Thus, Study 1’s findings were replicated 
in a larger sample: feelings of belongingness significantly mediated the relationship between 
free will beliefs and meaningfulness.  
4.2.4 Replication: Study 2. Similarly, we investigated if the indirect effect from 
Study 2 would replicate with only the specific measures of that prior study. As expected and 
replicating the findings in Study 2, belief in free will (Rakos et al., 2008) correlated positively 
and significantly with presence of meaning, r(265) = .34, p < .001. Similarly, belief in free 
will correlated positively and significantly with the reverse-scored loneliness scale (Russell, 
1996), r(265) = .31, p < .001. Finally, the reverse-scored loneliness scores correlated 
positively and significantly with meaningfulness, r(265) = .63, p < .001. The effect sizes of 
these correlations were medium and large, respectively (Cohen, 1988).  
To test our proposed indirect effect, we used Hayes’s (2012) PROCESS macro. The 
belief in free will scores were entered as the predictor variable in the model, reverse-scored 
loneliness was entered as the mediator, and presence of meaning was entered as the outcome 
variable (all standardized). As expected, there was a significant indirect effect of belief in free 
will on presence of meaning through belongingness, ab = 0.18, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.11, 
0.27], estimated using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstraps (Hayes, 2013), (Figure 5). The direct 
effect of belief in free will on meaningfulness remained significant, B = 0.16, SE = 0.05, p = 
.002. Therefore, Study 1 and 2’s findings were replicated in a larger sample: belief in free 
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will promotes meaningfulness through feelings of belongingness. As a final test of our 
hypothesis, we conducted multiple group comparisons and meta-analyses of Studies 1-3.  
5. Studies 1-3: Meta-Analysis and Multiple Group Comparisons 
 In Studies 1-3, we found significant, indirect effects of belief in free will on 
meaningfulness through feelings of belongingness. However, the sample sizes across these 
studies varied considerably in size. We conducted a meta-analysis on the correlations that 
composed the mediation model across the three studies as a further test of our hypothesis. In 
addition, we conducted multiple group comparisons to test if the indirect effects in Studies 1 
and 2 were not significantly different from those indirect effects that were composed of the 
same measures in Study 3. 
 5.1 Meta-analyses. We conducted three separate meta-analyses for each of the 
constituent paths in our proposed mediation model. For Study 3, we used the aggregated free 
will belief and belongingness scores. First, we conducted a meta-analysis on the relationship 
between free will beliefs and meaningfulness. Data from studies 1-3 and the pre-test were 
included in this analysis. The random-effects meta-analysis produced a mean effect size for 
the correlation between free will beliefs and meaningfulness of d = 0.88, SD = 0.27, 95% CI 
[0.48, 1.27]. Thus, there was a significant relationship between free will beliefs and 
meaningfulness across studies (Figure 6).  
Next, we conducted a meta-analysis on the relationship between free will beliefs and 
belongingness. The random-effects meta-analysis including the three studies produced a 
mean effect size for the correlation between free will beliefs and belongingness of d = 0.81, 
SD = 0.24, 95% CI [0.45, 1.16]. Thus, there was a significant relationship between free will 
beliefs and belongingness across studies (Figure 7).  
 Finally, we conducted a meta-analysis on the relationship between belongingness and 
meaningfulness. The random-effects meta-analysis including the three studies produced a 
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mean effect size for the correlation between belongingness and meaningfulness of d = 1.51, 
SD = 0.26, 95% CI [1.12, 1.95]. Therefore, there was a significant relationship between 
belongingness and meaningfulness across studies (Figure 8).  
5.2 Multiple group comparisons. Next, we conducted multiple group comparisons to 
assess if the indirect effects in Study 3 were not significantly different from the equivalent 
indirect effects in Studies 1 and 2.  
5.2.1 Mediation analysis 1. First, we investigated the indirect effect when data from 
the same measures in Studies 1 and 3 were combined. As expected, there was a significant 
indirect effect of belief in free will on meaningfulness through a sense of belongingness, ab = 
0.20, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.14, 0.27]. Thus, our findings from Studies 1 and 3 were 
replicated. 
In addition, our analysis showed that the indirect effects that used the same measures 
in Studies 1 and 3 did not differ significantly from each other, B = -0.11, SE = 0.07, 95% CI 
[-0.24, 0.02]. Thus, our conclusions from Studies 1 and 3 have been substantiated.  
5.2.2 Mediation analysis 2. Similarly, we investigated the indirect effect when data 
from the same measures in Studies 2 and 3 were combined. As expected, there was a 
significant indirect effect of belief in free will on meaningfulness through feelings of 
belongingness, ab = 0.16, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.10, 0.23]. Therefore, we replicated our 
findings from Studies 2 and 3. 
Finally, we conducted a multiple group comparison to assess if the indirect effect in 
Study 2 was not significantly different from its equivalent in Study 3. Our analysis showed 
that the indirect effects in Studies 2 and 3 that used the same measures did not differ 
significantly from each other, B = -0.07, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.19, 0.08]. Thus, our 
conclusions from Studies 2 and 3 have been corroborated. 
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6. General Discussion 
People have existential needs to experience meaning in life (e.g., Greenberg et al., 
2004). In this regard, strong beliefs in free will are associated with meaningfulness (Crescioni 
et al., 2016; Seto et al., 2014) Simultaneously, belongingness is also a source of meaning 
(Heine et al., 2006; Williams, 2002). Our hypothesis was that belief in free will promotes 
meaningfulness through feelings of belongingness. We based our hypothesis on previous 
research that established causal relationships between free will beliefs and behaviors related 
to belongingness (e.g., MacKenzie et al., 2014; Shariff et al., 2014; Stillman & Baumeister, 
2010b) and between belongingness and presence of meaning in life (e.g., Stillman et al., 
2009; Williams, 2002). Specifically, we proposed that beliefs in free will are positively 
associated with a sense of belongingness that in turn promotes a sense of meaningfulness. In 
other words, we predicted that the relationship between free will beliefs and meaning in life 
perceptions is transmitted, at least in part, by feelings of belongingness. Across three studies, 
we found consistent support for our hypothesis, connecting different research domains that 
collectively had limited empirical findings. In Study 1, we found positive and significant 
relationships between each of these variables. Additionally, the relationship between free will 
beliefs and meaningfulness was significantly mediated by feelings of belongingness. In Study 
2, we employed different measures of free will belief and belongingness, yielding similar 
results. In Study 3, we replicated the indirect effects from the earlier studies using a 
substantially larger sample. In addition, the indirect effect withheld when composite 
measures of the main constructs were entered into the model. Furthermore, there were no 
significant differences in the indirect effects between studies that used the same measures. 
Finally, meta-analyses showed significant relationships between the constructs across Studies 
1-3, corroborating our conclusions. We believe that the present research is the first set of 
FREE, CONNECTED, AND MEANINGFUL                                                                        22 
 
studies to demonstrate that belief in free will promotes meaningfulness through feelings of 
belongingness and indeed empirically links free will beliefs to feelings of belongingness.  
6.1 Belief in Free Will Adds to Meaning in Life via Belongingness 
Our findings substantiate previous research claiming that belief in free will has 
important societal implications (Baumeister et al., 2008; Stillman & Baumeister 2010a). 
Belief in free will seems to encourage thoughtful reflection and effort to overcome automatic, 
anti-social impulses (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2011; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010a; Stillman, 
Baumeister, et al., 2011). These processes seem to benefit interpersonal relations 
(Baumeister, 2008a). That is, belief in free will may be a functional cultural belief that 
encourages self-restraint for societal harmony, approval and acceptance into social groups, 
and thereby facilitates feelings of belongingness (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Bertelsen, 
2011). 
Our findings also contribute to Baumeister’s (2008a, 2008b) theory on the cultural 
and evolutionary function of belief in free will. Humanity benefitted greatly from creating 
and participating in the cultures of social groups. Individual differences that motivated people 
to gain acceptance and avoid rejection were essential for survival (Malone et al., 2012) and 
thereby to fulfill humanity’s need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). This culture within 
social groups required a new form of action control to inhibit innate, selfish impulses 
(Baumeister, 2005, 2008a, 2008b; Baumeister et al., 2011). Building on earlier capacities 
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 2011), free will beliefs likely enabled humanity to create, participate 
in, and benefit from culture, by facilitating thoughtful reflection and self-restraint 
(Baumeister et al., 2008), which ultimately afforded people acceptance into groups and 
thereby feelings of belongingness. This is because approval is a prerequisite for forming and 
maintaining social bonds (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Historically, belief in free will helped 
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people to restrain their impulses in order to gain acceptance to groups, which in turn 
promoted feelings of belongingness (e.g., Baumeister, 2008b). 
Simultaneously, belongingness is a core human need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and 
a source of meaning (Heine et al., 2006). Free will beliefs seem paramount in order to control 
anti-social impulses to achieve a sense of belongingness (Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & 
Schooler, 2008). Simultaneously, people’s need to belong serves a variety of important 
functions, including providing people with a sense of meaning (e.g., Heine et al., 2006; 
Williams, 2002). As a result, at least part of the relationship between free will beliefs and a 
sense of belongingness can be understood as contributing to a sense of meaningfulness (i.e., 
meaningfulness substantiates the relationship between free will belief and belongingness). 
Although previous research has identified that belief in free will promotes meaningfulness by 
allowing people to set future, meaningful goals (Crescioni et al., 2016), our research extends 
on the relationship between free will beliefs and meaningfulness that may also occur through 
a different pathway via feelings of belongingness.  
6.2 Practical Applications 
Our findings have some practical applications. Stillman, Baumeister, et al. (2011) 
noted that belief in free will is associated with achieving delayed rather than immediate 
benefits, a trait that is essential for the functioning of society. In this context, belief in free 
will predicts better work performance (Stillman et al., 2010) and pro-social behaviors (e.g., 
MacKenzie et al., 2014; Seto et al., 2014). These positive societal outcomes associated with 
belief in free will and belongingness may enhance social capital (Putnam, 2000). Ultimately, 
increased belongingness and social capital could address peoples’ meaning needs (Heine et 
al., 2006) and alleviate maladaptive behaviors associated with meaninglessness (DeWall, 
Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009; Twenge et al., 2003; Vohs & Baumeister, 2010). Clark 
et al. (2014) suggested that situational factors could be investigated that promote beliefs in 
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free will and moral behaviors associated with belongingness, considering these positive 
societal implications (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). By identifying 
how free will beliefs are associated with promoting feelings of belongingness and 
meaningfulness, perhaps the dynamics of these relationships could be fostered in youth 
development programs (e.g., to promote pro-social behaviors; Siu, Cheng, & Leung, 2006).   
6.3 Nature of the Mediation Model 
6.3.1 Individual differences. Regarding our proposed model, our hypothesis was 
based on previous research that established causal relationships between free will beliefs and 
behaviors related to belongingness (e.g., MacKenzie et al., 2014; Shariff et al., 2014; Stillman 
& Baumeister, 2010b) and between belongingness and presence of meaning in life (e.g., 
Stillman et al., 2009; Williams, 2002). Based on these established causal relationships, we are 
confident in the ordering of variables in our proposed mediation model. Our studies have 
since extended on these established relationships by highlighting how the two research 
domains integrate with each other. One limitation of our studies, however, is that they had 
correlational designs. These designs limit what mediation models can tell empirically about 
the causal and long-term relationships between constructs. Our choice of the studies’ designs 
was partly based on the fact that the model was composed of established causal relationships, 
that belief in free will is a relatively stable trait (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012; Paulhus & 
Carey, 2011), and is culturally universal (Sarkissian et al., 2010). Additionally, continuous 
predictor variables are acceptable to include in mediation analyses when the proposed model 
and indirect effect(s) are informed by theory, as presented here (Hayes, 2013; Hayes & 
Scharkow, 2013), and if the effects of interest do not take time to unfold (Preacher & Kelly, 
2011). Indeed, prior research on belief in free will suggests that, longitudinally speaking, 
people generally tend to believe in free will (Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Baumeister, 
2010). Thus, the processes between the constructs may be inherent in modern human 
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psychology. Furthermore, other research on the effects of belief in free will has also 
employed correlational designs (e.g., Feldman et al., 2016; Stillman et al., 2010; 2011). 
 Although these designs can be beneficial for exploratory studies that establish novel 
indirect effects between constructs, more evidence is required for causal relations 
(Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). Therefore, experimental and longitudinal replications of these 
studies that examine (latent) cross-lagged mediation models will provide greater support for 
the mediated relationship reported. Concurrently, we stress that the causal ordering of 
variables in our mediation models was theoretically informed, supplemented by using 
different materials across studies, and we found convergent results (Hayes, 2013). 
Accordingly, we tested whether the observed trait-level data were consistent with our 
theoretical model, which they were.  
On this note, Feldman et al. (2016) recently found that belief in free will and trait self-
control interacted, such that best performance among participants was achieved when both 
trait self-control and belief in free will were high. Feldman et al. (2016) interpret these results 
as suggesting that the exertion of self-control to control one's impulses requires the volitional 
choice to do so (e.g., free will; Baumeister, 2008a, 2008b) and the choice to exert control 
depends on the psychological resources to execute (Stillman et al., 2010). Thus, the belief in 
free will can be conceptualized as the freedom to choose the direction, whereas trait self-
control facilitates the pursuit of this direction over time. Ultimately, Feldman et al.’s 
interpretation suggests that self-control may be more appropriate for these longitudinal 
studies, rather than free will belief per se (see also Crescioni et al., 2016). 
6.3.2 Reciprocal relationships. In a similar context, we acknowledge that the 
relationships between the constructs in our theoretical model may have developed through 
evolution to become bi-directional. Social relationships may promote meaning in life and a 
stronger sense of meaning in life could also facilitate the formation of interpersonal 
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relationships. For example, Stillman, Lambert et al. (2011) showed that people who reported 
a stronger sense of meaning in life were more likely to be rated interpersonally appealing. 
Thus, people who have a strong sense of meaning in life may also facilitate the formation of 
interpersonal relationships.  
Concurrently, Stillman, Lambert, et al. (2011) note that people may seek to affiliate 
with those who have a strong sense of meaning, presumably as a means of satisfying their 
own need for meaning, consistent with the ordering of variables in our proposed model. 
Again, many human needs are met in human relationships, including the need for meaning 
(Baumeister, 2005; Heine et al., 2006). Indeed, in both correlational and experimental data, 
the absence of interpersonal relationships has been associated with low levels of meaning 
(Stillman et al., 2009; Williams, 2002). Importantly, regarding our ordering of variables in 
our model, meaning frameworks are derived through these close relationships (Heine et al., 
2006; Tomasello, 1999). That is, meaningfulness via feelings of belongingness may have 
developed over time that built on humanity’s adapted biological strategy and increased 
cognitive capacities. In turn, meaning maintenance may have been a further development 
from our foundational model in conjunction with humanity’s increased resources from 
interpersonal relationships. 
In a similar context, as initiative, a basic form of free will, likely developed first in 
human psychology from which people began living in social groups (Baumeister et al., 2011), 
and as evolution modifies  and extends these existing systems (Allman, 1999), we are 
confident in ordering free will belief before belongingness in our model. Specifically, 
Baumeister et al. (2011) contend that initially beliefs and psychological capacities emerged to 
improve survival and reproduction and that later adaptations built on these capacities in an 
increasingly social environment. Belief in free will would have helped people to restrain their 
impulses so as to gain acceptance and approval from groups, key factors that in turn would 
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promote feelings of belongingness (e.g., Baumeister, 2008b). Again, empirical evidence 
shows that belief in free will causally effects pro-social behavior that benefits, and may well 
maintain, belongingness to groups (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Stillman & Baumeister, 
2010b; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). These pro-social behaviors are dependent on limited self-
regulatory resources (Baumeister et al., 2011; DeWall et al., 2008; DeWall et al., 2007), 
which seem to be enacted specifically to initiate and maintain belongingness (e.g., 
Baumeister et al., 2005; Twenge et al., 2001; Twenge et al., 2003). Indeed, physiological 
evidence demonstrated that belief in free will causally effects neurological responses 
involved in self-control (e.g., Rigoni, Kühn, Sartori, & Brass, 2011; Rigoni, Pourtois, & 
Brass, 2015). Simultaneously, we acknowledge that psychological beliefs, capacities, and 
sociality mutually evolved in later stages of humanity’s evolution (Barchas, 1986). 
Nevertheless, free will beliefs, and its related psychological resources, would still be required 
to maintain and achieve feelings of belongingness long-term (Baumeister, 2008a, 2008b, 
Baumeister et al., 2011), consistent with the ordering of variables in our model. In summary, 
our results and reasoning represent a theoretically founded pathway that explains part of the 
relationship between free will beliefs, meaningfulness, and feelings of belongingness. 
Concurrently, reciprocal paths between the constructs may have developed later from this 
foundational model.  
6.3.4 Meaning search. One area for future research is to examine the role of meaning 
search in our proposed model. Indeed, Crescioni et al. (2016) found that search for meaning, 
included as a composite with meaningfulness, correlated with free will belief. Although 
search for meaning was not investigated in our research, belief in free will may harness 
meaning search because of the former’s links to goal setting (Crescioni et al., 2016). For 
example, in the context of our own research, it could be argued that belief in free will may 
facilitate meaning search if people seek belongingness specifically to fulfill their need for 
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meaningfulness (e.g., Heine et al., 2006; Stillman et al., 2009). On this note, it is important to 
state regarding our evolutionary theoretical framework that humanity’s search for 
meaningfulness may have developed later when their cognitive capacities allowed this (e.g., 
Sedikides & Skowronski, 2003). Again, this is because meaning frameworks are derived 
through close relationships (Heine et al., 2006; Tomasello, 1999). That is, the search for 
meaningfulness may have developed over time that built on humanity’s adapted biological 
strategy and increased cognitive capacities. In turn, search for meaning may have been a 
further development from our foundational model, although this contention is speculative and 
deserves further investigation. 
6.3.5 Other mediators and moderators. Additionally, although the data presented 
suggests that the relationship between free will beliefs and meaningfulness via a sense of 
belongingness is robust, belief in free will’s relationship with meaningfulness has other 
functions and mediators independent of feelings of belongingness (e.g., Crescioni et al., 
2016). Indeed, one suggestion for future research on this topic would be to integrate the 
relationship between belief in free will and meaningfulness into one model through two 
paths: one in which free will belief facilitates pursuit of meaningful goals (e.g., Crescioni et 
al., 2016) and another to promote societal coexistence (Baumeister 2008a, 2008b). In a 
similar vein, other researchers have highlighted that the effects of belief in free will may be 
moderated (e.g., Baumeister, Bauer, & Lloyd, 2011). For example, some have suggested that 
different structures and powers in societies can constrain free will (e.g., socio-economic 
status; Mick, 2007). These factors would likely impede on social engagement. In addition, 
there is general agreement in the literature that exercising free will depends on a large supply 
of a limited mental resource (Gailliot et al., 2007) that is used only intermittently. Therefore, 
people are likely incompletely self-disciplined and exercise free will only for specific 
purposes and in certain settings (Baumeister, 2008a, 2008b; Baumeister et al., 2008; 2010). 
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Collectively, these points converge on the argument that belief in free will may promote 
meaningfulness through a sense of belongingness, only in specific circumstances and for 
certain functions.   
7. Conclusion 
Our findings corroborate previous research claiming that belief in free will has 
important societal implications (Baumeister et al., 2008; Vohs & Baumeister, 2010). In 
accordance with theories outlining the evolutionary function and roots of belief in free will 
(Baumeister, 2008a; Baumeister et al., 2008), our data conform to our reasoning that belief in 
free will enables people to control their anti-social impulses that promotes acceptance and 
feelings of belongingness (Baumeister, 2005, 2008b) that is ultimately a source of 
meaningfulness. Again, to our knowledge, no previous research has demonstrated this model 
or indeed the relationship between belief in free will and feelings of belongingness. Further 
tests of the model are recommended. We believe that the current studies illuminate how 
research on free will beliefs in conjunction with meaning-making processes offers a 
beneficial theoretical framework to interpret the effects of and develop research on beliefs in 
free will.   
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Figure 1: Conceptual Representation of the Mediation Model (Study 1) 
Belongingness 
                             
Belief in Free Will 
                             
Presence of Meaning 
*p < .05 
**p < .001 
B = 0.23* B = 0.52** 
B = 0.20* (ab = 0.12, [0.02, 0.22]) 
]]) 
Figure 1: An outline of the relationship between belief in free will and presence of meaning, 
significantly mediated by feelings of belongingness. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual Representation of the Mediation Model (Study 2) 
Belongingness 
                             
Belief in Free Will 
                             
Presence of Meaning 
*p < .05 
**p < .001 
B = 0.27* B = 0.43** 
B = 0.12 (ab = 0.11, [0.03, 0.26]) 
]]) 
Figure 2: An outline of the relationship between belief in free will and presence of meaning, 
significantly mediated by feelings of belongingness. 
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Figure 3: Conceptual Representation of the Mediation Model (Study 3) 
Belongingness 
Composite 
  Belief in Free Will 
Composite 
                             
Presence of Meaning 
*p < .001 
B = 0.44* B = 0.54* 
B = 0.25* (ab = 0.24, [0.17, 0.33]) 
]]) 
Figure 3: An outline of the relationship between the belief in free will composite and 
presence of meaning, significantly mediated by a composite measure of feelings of 
belongingness. 
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Figure 4: Conceptual Representation of the Mediation Model (Study 3) 
                             
Presence of Meaning 
*p < .001 
B = 0.43* B = 0.53* 
B = 0.24* (ab = 0.23, [0.15, 0.32]) 
]]) 
                             
Belief in Free Will 
Belongingness 
Figure 4: An outline of the relationship between belief in free will and presence of 
meaning, significantly mediated by feelings of belongingness, replicating Study 1. 
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Figure 5: Conceptual Representation of the Mediation Model (Study 3) 
                             
Presence of Meaning 
*p < .005 
**p < .001 
B = 0.31** B = 0.59** 
B = 0.16* (ab = 0.18, [0.11, 0.27]) 
]]) 
                             
Belief in Free Will 
Belongingness 
Figure 5: An outline of the relationship between belief in free will and presence of 
meaning, significantly mediated by feelings of belongingness, replicating Study 2. 
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Cohen's d [95% CI] 
 
 
0.63 [0.05, 1.26] 
 
 
 
0.66 [0.24, 1.14] 
 
 
0.47 [0.03, 0.94] 
 
 
1.12 [0.86, 1.41] 
 
Figure 6: Forest Plot Including Correlations Between Free Will Beliefs 
and Meaningfulness (Studies 1-3) 
Study 1                              
Study 2                              
Study 3                              
Meta-Analysis                              
Study                              
Pre-Test                              
0.88 [0.48, 1.27]                              
Figure 6: An outline of the significant relationship between free will beliefs and 
meaningfulness across the studies. 
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Cohen's d [95% CI] 
 
 
0.46 [0.04, 0.91] 
 
 
 
0.55 [0.10, 1.03] 
 
 
1.00 [0.74, 1.28] 
 
 
0.81 [0.45, 1.16] 
 
Figure 7: Forest Plot Including Correlations Between Free Will Beliefs 
and Feelings of Belongingness (Studies 1-3) 
Study 1                              
Study 2                              
Study 3                              
Meta-Analysis                              
Figure 7: An outline of the significant relationship between belief in free will and feelings 
of belongingness across the studies. 
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Cohen's d [95% CI] 
 
 
 
1.35 [0.87, 1.89] 
 
 
 
1.04 [0.56, 1.57] 
 
 
 
1.71 [1.41, 2.04] 
 
 
 
 
1.51 [1.12, 1.95] 
 
Study 1                              
Study 2                              
Study 3                              
Meta-Analysis                              
Figure 8: An outline of the significant relationship between meaningfulness and feelings 
of belongingness across the studies. 
  
Study                              
Figure 8: Forest Plot Including Correlations Between Meaningfulness 
and Feelings of Belongingness (Studies 1-3) 
FREE, CONNECTED, AND MEANINGFUL                                                                        48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
